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    Still from digital imagery developed for Eros Eris (2007)  
Digital Imagery by Sarah Rubidge 
(Access this imagery in situ on www.sensedigital.co.uk/EE4.htm)1 
 
 
I write this paper as a practitioner-scholar, a choreographer whose artistic 
work in the digital domain appeals directly to the rhythms and flows of our 
more subliminal modes of understanding. It is to this mode of choreographic 
practice, sometimes known as digital choreography that this paper is 
addressed.  In this paper, I will be examining how embodied modes of 
consciousness are essential to the process of understanding liminal 
choreographic imagery in the digital domain, more specifically looking at these 
in relation to Deleuze’s notions of affect and sensation (Deleuze 2003). I will 
also be exploring the implications of recent discoveries by neuroscientists that 
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seem to bear a relationship to Deleuze’s discussions of affect/sensation. I 
suggest that the activities of the substrata of our material bodies (especially 
the flows of the nervous and circulatory systems and activity of the neuronal 
networks) constitute the hidden interfaces between human beings and their 
material and immaterial environments. I further suggest that the constant and 
automatic activities of this ‘hidden’ body are the underpinnings of the affective 
life, and of every encounter we have with the world (including the artistic), and 
that it is to this that many digital artists who exhibit a choreographic sensibility 
appeal directly.  
 
The imagery above, which is taken from a moving computer-generated image 
created for the dance work Eros Eris (2007)2 is an example of liminal imagery 
that has developed for and shown within the digital domain3. (Turner (1990) 
argues that the liminal is a site of transition, occupying the thresholds between 
understandings and perceptions.) Using human movement as its source 
material, the intention of such imagery is to leave viewers in a state in which 
they sense content in the imagery, rather than know what the content is.  
 
Similarly, digital imagery of the type shown above, lies on both a perceptual 
and conceptual threshold, hovering in an in-between state that is replete with 
ambiguity and indeterminacy in both perception and conception. Colin 
Turnbull (1990, p. 51) argues that in order to understand the liminal we need 
to adopt ‘…a technique of participation that demands the total involvement of 
our whole being’. I would suggest that it is this that liminal choreographic 
imagery in the digital domain encourages. Neither representational nor non-
representational, the imagery sits on the threshold of the two, and demands 
an embodied response.  
 
The liminal digital imagery that I use as a paradigm in this paper has its 
precedents in the visual arts. An early example is evident in William Turner’s 
work, for example, Northam Castle at Sunrise (1835-40) or Light and Colour 
(Goethe’s Theory) (1843). Turner’s paintings are awash with ambiguous 
forms, potentially representational features obscured within the more 
qualitative features permeating the painterly surface. Contemporary artists 
Mark Rothko, Anish Kapoor, and James Turrell have created similarly liminal 
works that opens the way for a sensory mode of understanding. In a very 
different mode, the work of Russian constructivist Naum Gabo whose interest 
in the perception of space, time and movement led him to propose that ‘…the 
rhythm in a work of art is as important as the structure and image’ (in Zeki, 
1994 p. 625) is also of relevance. Static, but alive with the rhythmic, it too 
inhabits a space-in-between. In all the above work our more embodied modes 
of consciousness must be brought into play if the work is to be ‘understood’ in 
a manner consonant with the artistic intent4. This, I would argue, applies 
equally to kinetic digital imagery. 
 
An examination of the principles underlying the liminal digital imagery 
discussed in this paper affords a bridge between artistic, philosophical and 
scientific understandings of the artistic response. Imagery such as this is not 
concerned with representing objects as we see (cognise) them, but in 
reaching below their representational surface to nöetic levels of 
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consciousness, whereby the objects reveal what Jacques Rivière calls their 
‘sensible essence’ in Zeki, 1998 p. 5)5. Examples of such imagery can be 
found in Hidden Histories (2001)6, m, and Sensuous Geographies, (2003)7. 
When viewing such digital imagery the rhythm of the traces of motion seems 
to invite an embodied mode of understanding.  
 
Many digital artists whose work resonates with that of the artists above take 
movement as their starting point. The digital imagery they produce suggests 
the flows of energy that betray those unseen becomings, which enliven the 
material world. An example of this can be found in Fugitive Moments (2006)8. 
This imagery is perceived through what is often called the ‘kinaesthetic’ 
sense, through the eyes, evoking as it does an interweaving of rhythmic flows 
that seem to articulate the intensities that lie within the perceived motion. The 
sensations experienced at this deeper level are not the sensations of the 
flesh. Rather they reflect, in Deleuze’s terms, the mobile forces that constitute 
the work in action, forces that ‘… blend into one another in subtle transitions, 
decompose, hardly glimpsed’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 186), ever on 
the edge of surface consciousness as we experience the work, but never 
materialised as a fully formed, resolved feeling or sensation.  
 
Here we are dealing with affect, that is the ‘…prepersonal intensity 
corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to 
another’ (Massumi in Deleuze and Guattari 1987 p. xvi).  Interestingly Brian 
Massumi (1996) argues that affect is analogous to  
 
… the ‘intensity’ which characterises a work of art … [it] is a non-conscious, 
never to be conscious remainder … embodied in purely autonomic reactions 
most directly manifested in the skin  –  at the surface of the body, at its 
interface with things … spreading over the generalised body surface, like a 
lateral backwash … travelling the vertical path between head and heart. 
                                                                                            (1996, p 221; my emphasis) 
 
 It is the ability of liminal digital imagery to create such affective resonances9, 
independent of ‘content’ or ‘meaning’ that holds my attention as both maker 
and viewer. 
 
The experiential state embodied in the notion of affect is complex, 
indeterminate. Affect is not physical sensation per se, but is closely aligned to 
the notion of ‘intensities’. Intensities express relations and degrees of 
variation, each intensity being both implicated in and responsive to the activity 
of other intensities. This interweaving of intensities generates a ‘variable 
ensemble of differential relations’ (Deleuze 1994), which in turn expresses a 
shifting, changing totality. It is of interest to me that this description could 
easily be a description of the human body, for beneath the mass and volume 
of the flesh and bone of our bodies lies a dynamic collection of interrelated 
systems of physiological flows and rhythms, each of which affects and is 
affected by the others. These flows are in a state of continuous variation, a 
state of transition that in Deleuze and Guattari’s words (1987, p. 261) 
‘…consists entirely of relations of movement and rest … [and] capacities to 
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affect and be affected’. The digital imagery of which I speak, appeals directly 
to this substratum of our understanding.   
 
Affect is a form of understanding that operates through the matrix of liminal 
perceptions in the body, and it is here that this notion begins to tally with 
current research by neuroscientists. The latter argue that the ‘subpersonal’ 
activity of different sets of neurons operating in parallel create networks of 
activity that give rise to our perceptions and affective experience of our 
environment. These subliminal modes of perception respond to the 
indeterminacies of liminal images and, through bodily resonance, constitute 
our embodied understanding of them. This is an entirely proper mode of 
understanding for liminal imagery. If our responses to the world are first and 
foremost ‘felt’ experiences, which do not necessarily reach what is generally 
referred to as ‘consciousness’, as well as seeing representations of ‘what it is 
out there’ we ‘feel’ what is out there. That is, it is less important to know what 
the imagery is than to experience how it is. This demands a shift in the mode 
of consciousness employed when observing such imagery.  
  
It appears to me that findings from contemporary neuroscience might also 
provide a clue as to the kind of consciousness brought to bear in the process 
of understanding liminal artworks. I would suggest that this form of 
consciousness goes deeper than either reflective consciousness10 or the 
phenomenological. The notions of consciousness forwarded by 
neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio (1999) and Gerald Edelman (2000) 
are central to this endeavour, for they incorporate not only reflective 
consciousness but also the more subliminal levels of consciousness derived 
from the autonomic physiological systems. These they call ‘core’ (Damasio) 
and ‘primary’ consciousness (Edelman). This form of consciousness 
generates the kind of understandings that are frequently considered to lie 
outside of the remit of reflective consciousness. These understandings are 
less accessible than the sensation inherent in ‘lived’ experience, for they 
operate in the domain of affect. Although many scientists invoke the writings 
of phenomenologists in support of their theories on the grounds that the ‘lived 
body’ is the constitute foundation of any perception, (Gallese, 2001, 2005; 
Evan Thompson, 2001 and 2007; and Francisco Varela, 1992), it might be 
that the work of philosophers who interrogate the notion of affect will prove to 
be a more appropriate line of enquiry in the exploration of the influence of the 
autonomic systems on our understanding of our experience. 
 
Nevertheless, even the inclusion of the phenomenological aspects of viewing 
art works would appear to many to sit uncomfortably with the work of 
neuroscientists, who are frequently charged by artists with diminishing the 
intrinsic values of the art experience through their reduction of that experience 
to physiological systems operating in the brain. This is not entirely fair, as 
many scientists who are actively interested in understanding how art is 
perceived, even whilst seeking to isolate and identify the detail of neuronal 
responses to artistic imagery, acknowledge that such mechanisms alone do 
not provide a sufficient explanation of the aesthetic experience (Freedberg & 
Gallese, 2007; Zeki and Lamb, 1994)11. They recognise that their scientific 
investigations offer only an understanding of the neurological mechanisms 
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that underlie our engagement in art works, and thus that, although neuronal 
activity is a necessary condition of the aesthetic experience, it is not a 
sufficient condition.  Indeed, scientists Semir Zeki and M. Lamb argue that 
‘…aesthetic experience must involve a great deal more than [the neurological] 
– learning, memory, individual variation and much more besides will pay a 
role’ (1994, p. 607).  
 
Even though neurological explanations are only partial I would suggest that 
this does not diminish their importance in understanding how art affects its 
audience. Like any phenomenon, art can be studied from a number of 
perspectives, and discussed at many levels of description, all of which can 
contribute to our understanding of that phenomenon. Zeki and Lamb’s 1994 
study of the neurobiology of kinetic art shows that some scientists recognise 
this. Zeki and Lamb suggested that the work of kinetic artists and of scientists 
are symbiotic, as the former could be said to be addressing directly in their art 
works the very issues with which neuroscience is concerned. The two 
scientists argue that, 
 
….when executing a work of art the [kinetic] artist unknowingly undertakes an 
experiment to study the organisation of the visual brain…. Just as 
physiologists have managed to identify visual areas in the cerebral cortex 
specialised for visual motion, so [kinetic] artists through their experiments, 
have unknowingly developed an art form seemingly tailored to an optimal 
stimulation of these visual clues.   
                                                                                (Zeki & Lamb, 1994, p. 608) 
 
By extension, they suggest, kinetic art might very well provide optimum 
conditions for the scientific study of certain facets of visual perception. Noting 
that motion is one of the most primordial of visual percepts, they argue that 
the kinetic art of the 1970s, by focusing primarily on motion (rather than 
shape, colour or imagery), stimulates the earliest activity in the neurological 
visual pathways. This would be of great value to scientists interested in 
studying the activity of the somatosensory neurological systems. 
 
They further point out that the visuo-association cortex is involved in 
advanced multisensory and sensorimotor integration in response to our 
experiences. This process of physiological integration, one could surmise, 
facilitates connections in between what we experience, what we see, and 
what we ‘know’. As such this system might have some effect on the way in 
which we might non-consciously make sensory connections when watching 
liminal kinetic digital imagery based in human movement, and through making 
those connections emerge with a sense of a content that is not explicitly 
represented12.  
 
Perhaps more significantly for an understanding of such imagery, recent 
experiments (1996-2009) by Giocamo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and 
Leonardo Fogassi, neuroscientists at the University of Parma, have identified 
what they call a Mirror Neuron System. This system exhibits very similar 
behaviour both when we engage in an action (expressive mode), and when 
we observe someone/thing engaged in that action (receptive mode), 
particularly if the observer has direct physical experience of the action, 
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whether it be grasping a stick or dancing.13 This they call ‘embodied 
simulation’. If the Mirror Neuron System generates an embodied simulation as 
a response to seeing human motion, it might be that this system is of 
particular relevance when watching apparently non-representational kinetic 
imagery that has human movement as its source.14 David Freedberg and 
Vittorio Gallese surmise that an element of an aesthetic response to art 
consists of an activation of the embodied mechanisms initiated by Mirror 
Neuron Systems, and that this constitutes an aspect of the experience of 
viewing both figurative and non-figurative art works (Freedberg and Gallese, 
2007). If this is the case then the Mirror Neuron System might be an important 
mechanism in the process of viewing art works.  Freedberg and Gallese argue 
further that the Mirror Neuron Systems can simulate implied actions, emotions 
and corporeal sensation represented in art works. They also suggest that 
even in non-representational works the relationship between a feeling 
generated by the embodied simulations in the Mirror Neuron System and the 
qualitative dimensions of the art work is an important element of the artistic 
experience. It is therefore possible that corporeal sensation activated through 
the Mirror Neuron System is initiated not only by representational images of 
motion but also by non-representational kinetic images such as those created 
by choreographically inclined digital artists.   
 
Neurological mechanisms that allow us to experience a sense of corporeal 
empathy when we view even non-representational art, offers some kind of 
explanation for the liminal sensations that we experience when we view non-
representational imagery that is grounded in human motion. 
 
 
 
Digital imagery from Eros Eris (2007) 
This imagery, created by Sarah Rubidge, is derived from traces of the motion of a dancer’s 
intricate circular arm gestures 
         (Access this image in motion on www.sensedigital.co.uk/EE5.htm) 
 
 
If one marries Zeki’s theories with the developing theories of  ‘mirror neuron’ 
theorists, it is possible to speculate that viewers have an empathic 
physiological response to the human motion implied in non-representational 
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liminal imagery created by digital choreographers. Certainly Freedberg and 
Gallese’s hypotheses (2007) seem to support this. In their paper they argue 
that in painting, even when there is not overt emotional content in an image, 
or the image is non-representational, a sense of bodily resonance can arise, 
for the movements that are implied in the physical traces of a static image can 
generate a bodily resonance with the ‘state’ that was embodied in the 
movement enacted by the artist when making the work.15   
 
One could speculate that, if mirror neurons can respond to the implied motion 
perceived in a static image, kinetic images grounded in human movement, 
such as those created by many digital choreographers who favour the 
nonrepresentational, might generate an even stronger embodied simulation in 
viewers familiar with the source movements, and thus engender an embodied 
understanding of the human movement implied in the non-representational 
images.  As an artist I have been working intuitively on this basis for many 
years. My preference for non-representational digital imagery grounded in 
human movement offers the viewer the ‘sensible essence’ of the subject, and 
follows the precept of early twentieth century artist Malevich that ‘…objective 
reality is only a starting point [for art], a motivation for the creation of new 
forms’ (Zeki, 1998, p. 9). This paper suggests that, when taken in the light of 
the discoveries of contemporary neuroscience, this artistic intuition might have 
its foundation in something beyond the merely aesthetic. 
 
 
 
                                            
Notes  
1 Clicking on any of the URLs referenced in the text gives immediate access to a moving 
version of the digital imagery.  
2 A collaboration between choreographer Liz Lea and myself. Video imagery can be accessed 
on www.sensedigital.co.uk/EE1.htm 
3 Most of the illustrations of, and references to digital imagery in this document are taken from 
my own collaborative work (see references and bibliography). Movies of the imagery and the 
artistic works of which it is a part can be found on www.sensedigital.co.uk. 
4 The notion of the artistic intent differs from that of the ‘artist’s intention’ (which tends to imply 
the use of the psychological intention of the artist as a justification for a critical interpretation, 
which gave rise to the influential ‘intentional fallacy’ argument of the 1950s (Beardsley & 
Wimsatt, 1954). They, along with Kuhns (1960), argue that the psychological intention of the 
artist is quite different from the artistic agency of the artwork, that is, the ‘work’ of the work 
(Benjamin 1994), although the two might overlap. It is in this latter sense that ‘artistic intention’ 
is used in this paper. 
5 For Husserl the nöetic was the intentional consciousness, transcendental in nature. Strictly it 
is ‘intuitive consciousness’, knowing unmediated by the workings of the intellect. 
6 A collaboration with digital artist Joseph Hyde and myself. Video imagery can be accessed 
on www.sensedigital.co.uk/hh1.ht 
7  A collaboration with composer Alistair Macdonald and myself. Video imagery can be 
accessed on www.sensedigitsal.co.uk/sg2.htm 
8  A collaboration with scientist Beau Lotto and computer scientist Erwan Le Martelot of 
Lottolab, University College London and myself. Video imagery can be accessed on 
www.sensedigital.co.uk/FMIMovs.htm 
9 The resonances are generated as the perception of the digital imagery  ‘…intervenes on the 
microscopic variations of a body’s biology, anatomy, movement and perception, while at the 
same time multiplying and re-mixing these variations.’ (Portanova, 2005, p. 1). I would argue 
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that this is as true of liminal visual imagery as it is of the sonic imagery that Portanova uses as 
her paradigm. 
10 The paradigm on consciousness in Western cultures.  
11 The use of the term aesthetic in relation to the experience of viewing art works raises 
certain questions, which there is not room to address here.  These must be reserved for 
another paper. 
12 Gallese (2005) has also noted that perception is physiologically multimodal, as the pre-
motor and parietal areas of the brain are neurally integrated, leading to the establishment of a 
multimodal cortical network.  
13 In dance specific experiments by Calvo-Merino and her colleagues it was shown that neural 
activity was greater in the brain of a capoeirera dancer when watching capoeirera dance than 
when watching ballet. The opposite obtained when the subject was a ballet dancer (Calvo-
Merino et al, 2005). 
14 Scientists offer some support for this notion though their experiments with biological motion, 
whereby the reduction of a motion captured image of a person walking to a series of dots 
were recognised as such by subjects. (The study of biological motion in psychophysics was 
initiated by G.Johanssen in 1973, but continues to attract the interests of psychophysicists 
such as Kourtsi Z, 1999; Thornton et al, 2003.) 
15 Although experiments have not yet been done with non-figurative art, a group of scientists 
have shown through experiments that a motor simulation of the gesture used to write a single 
letter or symbol is generated in the brain when simply looking at the written letter (Knoblich et 
al, 2002). Freedburg and Gallese hypothesise that if this is true of letters it should be true of 
other forms of marks with which we are familiar. 
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